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Abstract This paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete in-
formation, when both unlimited-usage (fixed-fee) pricing and usage-based pricing are feasible, and
administering usage-based pricing may involve transaction costs. It is shown that offering fixed-fee
pricing in addition to a non-linear usage-based pricing scheme is always profit-improving in the
presence of any non-zero transaction costs, and there may be markets in which a pure fixed-fee is
optimal. This implies that the optimal pricing strategy for information goods is almost never fully
revealing. Moreover, it is proved that the optimal usage-based pricing schedule is independent
of the value of the fixed-fee, a result that simplifies the simultaneous design of pricing schedules
considerably, and provides a simple procedure for determining the optimal combination of fixed-fee
and non-linear usage-based pricing. The introduction of fixed-fee pricing is shown to increase both
consumer surplus and total surplus. The differential effects of setup costs, fixed transaction costs
and variable transaction costs on pricing policy are described. These results suggests a number of
managerial guidelines for designing pricing schedules. For instance, in nascent information markets,
firms may profit from low fixed-fee penetration pricing, but as these markets mature, the optimal
pricing mix should expand to include a wider range of usage-based pricing options. The extent
of minimum fees, quantity discounts and adoption levels across the different pricing schemes are
characterized, strategic pricing responses to changes in market characteristics are described, and
the implications of the paper’s results for bundling and vertical differentiation of information goods
are discussed.
1I thank Roy Radner for a number of helpful discussions. I also thank Rajiv Banker, an anonymous associate
editor, three anonymous referees, Bing Jing, Ravi Mantena and seminar participants at Carnegie-Mellon University,
New York University, the University of Maryland, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of Rochester
for their feedback and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. All errors remain mine.
1 Introduction
Non-linear usage-based pricing is a popular price-discrimination technique which has been analyzed
extensively in the context of the electricity and long-distance telephone markets (Wilson, 1993).
This form of price-discrimination is used by many sellers of information goods. For instance,
corporate software manufacturers associate the price they charge each customer on their expected
usage of the software, by basing prices on the total processing speed of the servers on which the
software is licensed to run. ASP and application syndication models enable a variety of more direct
usage-based software pricing2. Apple’s iTunes music service is priced on a per-song basis.
In contrast, there are numerous examples of fixed-fee pricing for information goods, under which
customers pay a fixed periodic price that is independent of usage. Most ISP’s charge residential
customers a flat monthly subscription fee. The Wall Street Journal Online offers unrestricted
access for a fixed annual fee. Sprint PCS recently switched from a per-Mb pricing model to giv-
ing consumers unlimited wireless web access for a fixed monthly fee. AOL MusicNet’s premium
membership allows unlimited music streaming for about eighteen dollars a month.
Additionally, many sellers of information goods use a combination of fixed-fee and usage-based
pricing. A customer of IBM’s zSeries software can opt to pay a flat fee for unlimited usage, or to
use a reporting tool which tracks and charges for software usage on a monthly basis. In addition
to their regular per-minute pricing scheme, Sprint and AT&T both offer fixed-fee long-distance
telephony, and MCI sells an unlimited-usage local, long-distance and Internet service package for
a fixed monthly fee. Other information goods featuring both fixed-fee and usage-based pricing
include network bandwidth, the OCLC library information services, and industry research reports.
Pricing policies for information goods which include an unlimited-usage fixed-fee conflict with
well-known results from nonlinear pricing theory (Maskin and Riley, 1984, Wilson, 1993), which
have shown that under some fairly general assumptions, the optimal pricing policy for a monopolist
2While there are a number of diverse models that these ASP’s use to price their services, most involve some form
of rental pricing (Susarla, Barua and Whinston, 2001)
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should always be strictly based on usage. One goal of this paper is to demonstrate that this
disconnect between theory and practice can be rigorously explained by recognizing two unique
aspects of pricing information goods:
(A) An increase in the usage of an information good by a customer imposes near-zero or zero
direct variable costs of production on the seller. This makes unlimited-usage fixed-fee pricing
increasingly viable for these goods.
(B) There are typically fixed and variable transaction costs associated with the administering
of any usage-based pricing schedule. These costs are especially relevant when designing pricing
schedules for information goods because they are significant relative to the near-zero variable costs
of production that characterize information goods3.
The costs of administering usage-based pricing schedules (henceforth called transaction costs)
that are alluded to above stem from the many different activities which are necessary to viably
administer a usage-based pricing schedule. A seller must monitor and record the details of usage
for each individual customer. Even if the direct costs of electronic monitoring are low, the related
administration of billing, payment and settlement, and dispute resolution is expensive. When
charged a constant periodic fee, customers often are comfortable with automated and direct periodic
charges (to a credit card, for instance). In contrast, when pricing is based on usage, the seller may
need to periodically present each customer with an itemized statement of their usage. This requires
administering a reliable process for the delivery of these statements. The seller may need to mail and
process non-electronic statements and payments for those customers unable to use or uncomfortable
with electronic billing4.
Even computer-based usage monitoring systems are prone to error (an example familiar to most
readers might be their monthly statements of long-distance telephone usage), and this imposes
3In constrast, when variable costs are high relative to these costs of administering usage-based pricing, as is the
case for many physical goods, these transaction costs affect pricing only minimally.
4According to Forrester Research, as of January 2003, the adoption of online bill payment services is still very low
— under 10% of US households — despite household Internet penetration levels close to 60%.
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additional dispute resolution costs on the seller, which may be incurred even when a customer
merely conjectures that they have been incorrectly billed. The costs of handling related customer
service calls can be substantial, even with relatively low error rates. Moreover, errors in billing,
or perceptions thereof, can lead to future lost sales. The seller may need to maintain auditable
records of usage for each individual customer, in the event of future customer disputes. Clearly,
many of these per-customer transaction costs (itemized invoicing, for instance), are triggered by any
positive usage, while others (such as usage recording and error resolution) are likely to increase with
customer usage. There may also be one-time setup or periodic infrastructure costs to install and
run reliable processes that support the activities associated exclusively with usage-based pricing.
These drivers of transaction costs are unrelated to the production or delivery of the actual
digital good being sold, and are simply a consequence of offering a usage-based pricing scheme.
Consequently, sellers may want to mitigate these costs by offering some or all of their customers
a fixed-fee pricing scheme. This may seem especially attractive for sellers of mass-market digital
goods, where transaction costs are significant relative to the potential revenue firms may obtain
from each of their customers. Moreover, each customer is likely to be willing to pay more for the
option of unlimited usage. There is a trade-off, however — fixed-fee pricing precludes second-degree
price discrimination based on usage, and this is likely to adversely affect seller revenues.
The model in this paper analyzes this tradeoff by deriving the optimal combination of the unlim-
ited usage fixed-fee and the usage-based nonlinear pricing function, with very general assumptions
about customer preferences and transaction costs, and under incomplete information. It shows that
any positive fixed or variable transaction costs make it optimal for the monopolist to offer their
customers the option of a fixed-fee pricing scheme. It also establishes that the optimal choice of the
usage-based pricing schedule is independent of the value of the fixed-fee — a result that simplifies the
simultaneous design of pricing schedules significantly. Managerial implications for pricing design,
volume discounting, adoption patterns and market evolution are also discussed.
The optimal pricing of information systems has been studied quite extensively, most often with
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a focus on congestion pricing. This body of work includes a queuing model of ASP pricing by Cheng
and Koehler (1999), an analysis of pricing service facilities with nonlinear delay costs by Dewan and
Mendelson (1990), a model of usage-based pricing in a network by Gupta et. al. (2001) which is
based on the theoretical framework of Gupta et al. (1995), the seminal paper by Mendelson (1985)
on pricing computer services by internalizing delay externalities, which was followed by a model of
variable priority pricing under asymmetric information for queues by Mendelson and Whang (1990),
and a model of optimal IS pricing with network externalities by Westland (1992). Space constraints
preclude a more detailed survey or analysis — these papers focus specifically either on contrasting
usage-based pricing with alternate schemes, or on IS pricing under asymmetric information — which
makes their models most relevant to this paper.
This paper adds to this literature by presenting a new model directly contrasting fixed-fee and
nonlinear pricing of information goods within a very general analytical framework, and underlining
the importance of transaction costs (highlighted briefly by Varian, 2000) in the design of optimal
pricing schedules for information goods. Two related and active areas of information-goods research
into pricing and market segmentation — bundling and vertical differentiation (versioning) — have
indirectly shed some light on the trade-offs between fixed-fee and usage-based pricing, and this
relationship is discussed further in Section 6.
2 Model
2.1 Firm and customers
A monopoly firm sells an information good5 which may be used by customers in varying quantities.
Variable costs of production to the firm of creating copies or providing access to the product are
zero. Customers are heterogeneous, indexed by their type θ ∈ [θ, θ]. The preferences of a customer
5This may either be a homogeneous good (such as bandwidth) or a bundle of related heterogeneous quantity units
(for instance, a library of MP3 songs, where each successive unit of consumption is a download of a different song).
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of type θ are represented by the function
W (q, θ, p) = U(q, θ)− p, (1)
where q is the quantity of the product used and p is the total price paid by the customer. The
function U(q, θ) is referred to as the customer’s utility function. Numbered subscripts to functions
denote partial derivatives with respect to the corresponding argument. For instance, U1(q, θ) is
the partial derivative of U with respect to its first argument, and U12(q, θ) is the cross partial of U
with respect to its first and second arguments. This notation is preserved throughout the paper.
The utility function U(q, θ) has the following properties, for each θ ∈ [θ, θ]:
1. Increasing and concave value: U(0, θ) = 0;U1(q, θ) ≥ 0, U11(q, θ) < 0 for all q.
2. Higher customer types get higher utility: U2(q, θ) > 0 for all q > 0.
3. Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition: U12(q, θ) > 0 for all q.
4. Non-increasing absolute risk-aversion:
∂
∂θ
µ
−U11(q, θ)
U1(q, θ)
¶
≤ 0
5. Finite maximum value: lim
q→∞
U(q, θ) = v(θ) <∞.
Property 2 simply states that type θ orders customers based on the value they get from the
product. In addition, Property 3 implies that higher types get a higher increase in value than lower
types, from the same increase in usage. Property 4 states that higher types are also increasingly
less risk averse. Property 5 bounds the maximum value a customer can derive from the product,
ensuring that the monopolist cannot make infinite profits by offering unlimited-usage pricing. As
indicated above, the utility derived from maximal usage by type θ is represented using the function
v(θ) = lim
q→∞
U(q, θ) (2)
The firm does not observe the type of any customer, but knows F (θ), the probability distribution
of types in the customer population, and the corresponding density function f(θ), which is strictly
positive for all θ ∈ [θ, θ].
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Symbol Explanation
U(q, θ) Utility that customer type θ gets from usage level q.
v(θ) Maximum utility that customer type θ can get from usage. v(θ) = lim
q→∞
U(q, θ).
[θ, θ] Range of possible customer types θ.
f(θ), F (θ) Density and distribution functions of the customer type distribution.
C(q) Transaction costs of administering a usage-based pricing schedule for a customer
who uses quantity q. In Section 4, C(q) takes the form K + c(q) for q > 0.
q(θ), τ(θ) Usage-based contract (menu of quantity-price pairs) that is incentive compatible.
For a specific θ, q(θ) is the quantity and τ(θ) is the price for that quantity.
q∗(θ), τ∗(θ) Optimal incentive-compatible usage-based contract.
T Unlimited-usage fixed fee price.
θK Lowest customer type that uses a positive quantity under the usage-based contract.
θF Lowest customer type that is indifferent between fixed-fee and usage-based pricing.
Table 1: Summary of key notation
2.2 Pricing schedules
The information good is priced using one or both of two kinds of pricing schedules (also called
contracts):
Fixed-fee: A fixed-fee contract specifies a price T to be paid by the customer, in exchange for
unlimited usage of the information good. There are no transaction costs associated with a fixed-fee
contract — the customer simply pays the firm the deterministic, pre-specified price T .
Usage-based: A usage-based contract assigns a specific price to each level of usage q. Since
the firm cannot explicitly distinguish between customer types prior to contracting, the entire menu
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of quantity-price pairs must be available to all customers. The revelation principle ensures that the
firm can restrict its attention to direct mechanisms — that is, usage-based contracts in which one
specific quantity-price pair is designed for each customer, and in which it is rational and optimal for
the customer to choose the quantity-price pair that was designed for him or her6. The usage-based
contract is represented by a menu of quantity-price pairs (q(t), τ(t)), where t ∈ [θ, θ]. This menu
must satisfy two standard constraints:
[IC]: For each θ, U(q(θ), θ)− τ(θ) ≥ U(q(θˆ), θ)− τ(θˆ), for all θˆ ∈ [θ, θ].
[IR]: For each θ, U(q(θ), θ)− τ(θ) ≥ 0.
When the menu of quantity-price pairs satisfies (IC) and (IR), every customer of type θ will
choose the pair q(θ), τ(θ). For brevity, a usage-based contract satisfying these constraints is simply
referred to as incentive-compatible. An incentive-compatible usage-based contract is said to be
optimal for a sub-interval [θL, θH ] if it yields profits that are at least as high as any other incentive-
compatible usage-based contract designed exclusively for customers in the sub-interval [θL, θH ].
When no sub-interval is mentioned, optimality applies to the entire interval [θ, θ]
The firm bears transaction costs of C(q) for each customer who adopts the usage-based contract
and uses a quantity q. The drivers of these costs are discussed at length in Section 1.
2.3 Interaction between the firm and its customer
The sequence of interaction between the firm and its potential customers is as follows:
1. The firm designs and posts either an incentive-compatible usage-based pricing schedule
(q(.), τ(.)), a fixed-fee price T , or both.
2. Each customer either chooses to purchase under one of the two pricing schedules or chooses
not to purchase. If a customer chooses the fixed-fee contract, a fixed payment of T is made to the
6This kind of formulation is standard in models of price screening — see, for instance, section 2 of Anderson (1996).
A good exposition of mechanism design, the revelation principle and its applications to pricing can be found in
chapter 7 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
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firm. Since the usage-based pricing schedule (q(.), τ(.)) is incentive compatible, a customer of type
θ who chooses this pricing schedule uses a quantity q(θ) and makes a payment of τ(θ).
The problem for a customer of type θ is to choose between paying a fixed fee T for maximal
usage (and a corresponding value v(θ)), paying τ(θ) for a usage level q(θ), or not participating.
The problem of the firm is to choose the kinds of contracts (fixed-fee, usage-based, both) to offer,
and to design these contract(s) to maximize ex-ante expected profits.
3 The optimality of offering fixed-fee pricing
This section describes how fixed-fee pricing affects customer choice, and establishes that in the
presence of non-zero transaction costs, a fixed-fee pricing scheme always improves profits for the
seller of an information good. First, a preliminary result is established:
Lemma 1 If q(θ), τ(θ) is an incentive-compatible contract, then:
(a) q1(θ) ≥ 0, τ1(θ) ≥ 0.
(b) U(q(θ), θ)− τ(θ) is non-decreasing in θ.
Unless specified otherwise, all proofs are in Appendix A. The expression U(q(θ), θ)−τ(θ) is the
surplus obtained by a customer of type θ from the contract q(.), τ(.) and is commonly referred to
as the informational rent for type θ.
3.1 The impact of a fixed-fee on customer choice
The main result of this sub-section establishes that when a fixed-fee is offered along with any
incentive-compatible usage-based contract, then customers typically bifurcate into two intervals,
with lower types adopting the usage-based contract, and higher types adopting the fixed-fee.
Suppose the firm offers a fixed fee contract T along with a usage-based contract (q(.), τ(.))
which is incentive compatible in the absence of T . The surplus that a customer of type θ gets from
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choosing the fixed-fee contract is v(θ) − T . Therefore, a customer of type θ will choose the fixed
fee contract if and only if
v(θ)− T ≥ U(q(θ), θ)− τ(θ), (3)
where it is assumed that an indifferent customer chooses the fixed-fee contract. Note that equation
(3) is equivalent to
v(θ)− U(q(θ), θ) + τ(θ) ≥ T . (4)
The expression on the LHS of (4) has a simple economic interpretation. It is the difference between
the maximum value v(θ) obtainable by type θ from the information good, and the informational
rent [U(q(θ), θ) − τ(θ)] that type θ gets from their optimal usage under the usage-based pricing
schedule. Consequently, it is the maximum fixed-fee that the firm can charge if they want type θ
to adopt the fixed-fee. Lemma 2 shows that this maximum amount is increasing in θ.
Lemma 2 For any incentive-compatible usage-based contract (q(.), τ(.)), the function
ψ(θ) = v(θ)−U(q(θ), θ) + τ(θ) (5)
is strictly increasing for all θ in [θ, θ).
This lemma leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If the firm introduces a fixed-fee T in addition to an existing usage-based contract
(q(.), τ(.)) which is incentive-compatible in the absence of T , this affects customer choice in exactly
one of the following three ways:
(a) If v(θ)− T ≥ U(q(θ), θ)− τ(θ), then all customers adopt the fixed-fee contract;
(b) If v(θ)−T < U(q(θ), θ)−τ(θ), then all customers continue to adopt the usage-based contract;
(c) If v(θ) − T < U(q(θ), θ) − τ (θ) and v(θ) − T ≥ U(q(θ), θ) − τ(θ), then customers of type
θ ∈ [θ, θF ) continue to adopt the usage-based contract, and customers of type θ ∈ [θF , θ] switch to
the fixed-fee contract, where
θF = min{θ : v(θ)− U(q(θ), θ) + τ(θ) = T}. (6)
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Figure 1: The impact of fixed-fee pricing on customer choice.
Proof. Combining (4) and the fact that ψ(θ) is increasing (as shown in Lemma 2) establishes
that if type θˆ adopts the fixed fee contract, then so do all types θ > θˆ. In addition, if type θˆ does
not adopt the fixed-fee contract, then neither does any type θ < θˆ. This proves parts (a) and (b).
If the conditions for (c) hold, then since ψ(θ) is increasing in [θ, θ], this ensures that there will be
at least one type θ for which ψ(θ) = T . Since θF is the lowest such value of θ, and indifferent
types adopt the fixed-fee contract, this proves part (c), which completes the proof.
As illustrated by Figure 1, T is always higher than τ(θF ), but may be lower than τ(θ). Therefore,
while a fraction [θF , θT ] of customer types always pay a higher price, there may be a fraction of
customer types [θT , θ] who pay a lower price under the fixed-fee. The firm gains revenue from the
former set, but may lose revenue from the latter set. It also lowers costs in the interval [θF , θ] as
a consequence of having no transaction costs from all customers adopting the fixed-fee T .
3.2 Profit-improving fixed-fees
This sub-section establishes that the profits of a seller of information goods can always be strictly
improved by the introduction of an unlimited-usage fixed-fee. First, we establish that under the
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optimal usage-based contract in the absence of a fixed fee, the firm’s profits from each customer is
positive and non-decreasing in their type:
Lemma 3 If q∗(θ), τ ∗(θ) is the optimal usage-based contract in the absence of a fixed fee, then
(a) τ ∗(θ)−C(q∗(θ)) is non-decreasing in θ.
(b) τ∗(θ)−C(q∗(θ)) ≥ 0 for all θ
The main result of the section now follows:
Proposition 2 If transaction costs are non-zero — that is, if C(q) > 0 for q > 0 — then it is always
profit-improving for the seller of an information good to offer a fixed-fee contract.
Proof. Let q∗(θ), τ∗(θ) be the optimal usage-based contract in the absence of a fixed-fee. If
q∗(θ) = 0, then from Lemma 1, q∗(θ) = 0 for all θ, profits are zero, and the fixed fee T = v(θ)
strictly improves profits. If q∗(θ) > 0, then C(q∗(θ)) > 0. Now, choose any fixed fee T such that
[τ∗(θ)−C(q∗(θ))] < T < τ∗(θ). (7)
Since v(θ) ≥ U(q, θ) for all q, it follows that:
v(θ)− T > U(q∗(θ), θ)− τ∗(θ), (8)
and Proposition 1 ensures that a fraction [θF , θ] of customer types (perhaps all) will adopt the fixed
fee. From equation (7), we know that T > τ∗(θ)−C(q∗(θ)). Using Lemma 3(a), this implies that:
τ∗(θ)−C(q∗(θ)) < T for all θ ∈ [θF , θ]. (9)
As a consequence, the profits from each customer type in [θF , θ] are strictly increased by the
introduction of the fixed fee T . Proposition 1 ensures that for θF > θ, customers in [θ, θF ) continue
to adopt the usage based contract q∗(θ), τ∗(θ), and profits from this segment remain unchanged.
Therefore, the firm’s overall profits are increased by the introduction of T , which completes the
proof.
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In the absence of changes to (q∗(.), τ∗(.)), the increase in the firm’s profits is feasible due to
two separate effects. The first is the elimination of transaction costs for the adopters of the fixed
fee. The second is an increase in total surplus from the higher usage levels of these adopters, which
may induce a net increase in revenues. Recall that the firm bears no additional variable production
costs from this increase in usage of the information good.
4 The optimal combination of fixed-fee and usage-based pricing
Proposition 2 establishes the desirability of fixed-fee pricing for information goods under very gen-
eral conditions — for any positive transaction cost function C(q) and for any absolutely continuous
customer type distribution F (θ). In this section, the structure of the optimal fixed-fee and usage-
based pricing schedules is established in more detail. The transaction cost function C(q) is assumed
to take the following form:
C(q) = 0 for q = 0; (10)
C(q) = K + c(q) for q > 0,
where K ≥ 0, c1(q) ≥ 0 (non-decreasing variable costs), and variable costs are ‘not too concave’:
c11(q)
c1(q)
>
U11(q, θ)
U1(q, θ)
for all θ. (11)
The condition (11) above is met by any linear or convex cost function, a cost function which is
positive and constant for all q > 0, as well as a range of concave cost functions7. As described
in Section 1, many per-customer transaction costs may be triggered by any positive usage level,
simply because a usage-based pricing schedule has to be administered. Other transaction costs are
proportionate to the level of usage of the information good. The flexible specification in (10) allows
both these kinds of costs, and also admits varying levels of economies of scale.
7Equation (11) ensures that the firm’s profit function is strictly quasiconcave. It may not be a necessary condition
for the results that follow, but in its absence, optimal pricing cannot be easily mathematically characterized, since
the point-wise optimization problem is not guaranteed to have a unique local maximum.
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The type distribution is restricted to having a non-increasing inverse hazard rate:
∂
∂θ
µ
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
¶
≤ 0 for all θ.
This property is satisfied by most commonly-used unimodal distributions, and the restriction is
standard in models of price discrimination.
4.1 Optimal usage-based pricing in the absence of a fixed fee
The result in this sub-section characterizes the structure of the optimal usage-based contract
q∗(θ), τ∗(θ) when the firm does not offer a fixed fee contract:
Proposition 3 The optimal usage-based contract (q∗(θ), τ∗(θ)) in the absence of a fixed-fee takes
the following form:
q∗(θ) = 0 for θ < θK ; (12)
τ∗(θ) = 0 for θ < θK ; (13)
q∗(θ) = q0(θ) for θ ≥ θK ; (14)
τ∗(θ) = U(q∗(θ), θ)−
θZ
θK
U2(q
∗(x), x)dx for θ ≥ θK , (15)
where q0(θ) and θK are defined by:
U1(q
0(θ), θ) = c1(q0(θ)) + U12(q0(θ), θ)
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
∀θ (16)
θK = min{θ : U(q0(θ), θ) ≥ [K + c(q0(θ))]} (17)
Also, if U122(q, θ) ≤ 0, then q∗1(θ) > 0 for all θ ≥ θK , and the optimal contract is therefore fully-
revealing for all customers who use non-zero quantities.
Proposition 3 indicates that increases in the transaction costs tend to increase prices corre-
spondingly, and shrink the fraction of adopters of the information good. Furthermore, for any
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K > 0, the optimal usage-based contract is a nonlinear two-part tariff. Since U1(0, θ) > 0, it is
clear from equation (17) that q0(θK) > 0. As a consequence, there is a minimum price τ∗(θK)
for usage above zero but less than q∗(θK), and variable pricing beyond that. This is a commonly
observed pricing structure for digital goods, and Proposition 3 establishes that it it always induced
when per-customer transaction costs have a usage-independent component K > 0.
4.2 Independence of fixed-fee and usage-based pricing
The result of this sub-section is to show that the optimal usage-based pricing schedule in the pres-
ence of an unlimited-usage fixed-fee is independent of the value of the fixed-fee. As a consequence,
the simultaneous derivation of the optimal combination of usage-based and fixed-fee pricing is
simplified considerably.
Using Proposition 3, we know how to design the pricing schedule (q∗(θ), τ∗(θ)) which is optimal
in the absence of a fixed fee. While Proposition 2 has established the desirability of a fixed-fee
contract T in addition, it does not indicate what the optimal value of T should be. When a fraction
[θF , θ] of the customers no longer adopt the optimal usage-based contract (q∗(θ), τ∗(θ)), the firm
may want to redesign pricing for the remaining customer types [θ, θF ] in a profit-improving way.
This may change the value of the lowest type θF who is indifferent. Consequently, in order to
evaluate the net profit impact of each feasible fixed fee, one needs to consider optimally redesigned
usage-based contracts for a continuum of sub-intervals. Moreover, it is not guaranteed that a
combination of this form is in fact optimal — for instance, a higher value of T , and a correspondingly
constrained incentive-compatible contract may be more profitable. Therefore, to find the optimal
combination, the firm needs to vary T , while simultaneously considering all feasible incentive-
compatible contracts (and their profits from corresponding adoption) under the constraints imposed
by the existence of each T . Proposition 4 describes the solution to this problem:
Proposition 4 The optimal usage-based contract in the presence of the optimal fixed-fee is indepen-
dent of the value of the fixed-fee, and is identical to the optimal usage-based contract in the absence
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of any fixed-fee. Consequently, the optimal combination of fixed-fee and usage-based contracts can
be constructed as follows:
(a) Determine the optimal usage-based contract (q∗(.), τ∗(.)) using Proposition 3.
(b) Find the optimal interval of types [θ∗F , θ] who should adopt the fixed-fee contract by solving:
θ∗F = argmax
θF
θFZ
θK
[τ∗(θ)−C(q∗(θ))]f(θ)dθ + [1− F (θF ] [v(θF )− U(q∗(θF ), θF ) + τ∗(θF )] . (18)
(c) Determine the optimal fixed-fee contract:
T ∗ = v(θ∗F )− U(q∗(θ∗F ), θ∗F ) + τ∗(θ∗F ). (19)
Proposition 4 is a surprising result. It shows that when the firm uses the optimal fixed-fee
contract, and this contract is adopted by a positive fraction of customers, the optimal usage-
based contract offered to the remaining customers remains unchanged, even though the usage-based
contract is being designed for a different (and smaller) interval of customers. Were the seller to
design a usage-based contract exclusively for this smaller interval, ignoring the fixed-fee, it would
always be different from (q∗(θ), τ∗(θ)). When the firm does take the introduction of the fixed fee
into account, this introduces a new (and infinite) set of individual rationality inequality constraints,
which change as one varies either the level of the fixed-fee T or the sub-interval [θF , θ] that the firm
wants to induce to adopt T . Either of these changes necessitates a redesign of optimal usage-based
pricing. Proposition 4 reduces this complicated sequence to a simple problem of determining a
globally optimal usage-based pricing schedule, and then solving an unconstrained maximization
problem in a single variable.
An immediate corollary of Proposition 4 is that the introduction of the optimal fixed-fee contract
(and the consequent adjustment of customer usage) does not reduce the surplus of any customer,
relative to the scenario in which only usage-based pricing is offered. Since the surplus of those
customers adopting the fixed-fee increases, this means that consumer surplus strictly increases as
well. Proposition 2 ensures that firm profits also strictly increase, implying that total surplus also
increases on account of the fixed fee.
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Example: U(q, θ) = (w+ θ)q − 12q2; C(q) = K + cq; F (θ) = 1− (1− θ)b
Optimal usage-based contract:
q∗(θ) = (θ +w)− (c+ 1− θ
b
);
τ ∗(θ) =
1 + bc+w
1 + b
q∗(θ)− [q
∗(θ)]2
2(1 + b)
(A) Uniform type distribution: b = 1, w ≥ 0, c ≥ 0, K ≥ 0
Lowest adopter of usage-based contract θK =
2K + 1− (w − c)2
2(1 +w− c)
Lowest adopter of fixed-fee contract θ∗F = 1−
¡p
4c2 + 2c(1 +w− c2) + 2K − 2c
¢
(B) Positively-skewed type distribution: b > 1, w = 0, c ≥ 0, K = 0
Lowest adopter of usage-based contract θK =
1 + bc
1 + b
Lowest adopter of fixed-fee contract θ∗F = 1−
b
³p
4b2c2 + c(2− c)(2b− 1)− 2bc
´
2b− 1
Table 2: Optimal contracts and indifferent customer types in the example
Apart from per-customer transaction costs C(q), the seller may also bear a setup cost of admin-
istering a usage-based contract, which is incurred if the seller wishes to offer usage-based pricing
to any fraction of customers. This kind of cost increases the likelihood that the seller will offer just
fixed-fee pricing, and forego usage-based pricing entirely. However, if the seller still chooses to offer
usage-based pricing, this cost does not alter the optimal pricing schedules, and does not affect any
of the results derived above. This is discussed further in the paper’s extended appendix.
5 Example and discussion
The general results derived above are applied to a simple example, and some managerial guidelines
are drawn from this exercise. In the example, the customers’ utility function is assumed to be:
U(q, θ) = (w+ θ)q − 1
2
q2 for q ≤ w + θ (20)
U(q, θ) =
(w+ θ)2
2
for q > w+ θ (21)
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fixed-fee contract
Adopters of the
usage-based contract
Switched from usage-based to not 
adopting as either c or K increases
Switched from usage-based to
fixed-fee as either c or K increases
Non-adopters
 
K F
Figure 2: How increasing transaction costs K and c affects customer adoption.
It is easily verified that U122(q, θ) = 0, and therefore, the conditions in Proposition 3 describe the
unique optimal usage-based contract. The transaction cost function takes the form C(q) = K+ cq.
In addition, customer types are assumed to have the beta distribution8 with parameters a = 0,
b ≥ 1, and support θ ∈ [0, 1].
Applying Proposition 3 yields the optimal usage-based contract (q∗(θ), τ∗(θ)), summarized in
Table 2. The corresponding expressions for θK (the lowest type adopting the usage-based contract,
as specified in Proposition 3) and θ∗F (the lowest type adopting the fixed-fee contract, as specified in
Proposition 4) are summarized in Table 2 for two separate cases. In the first case, customer types
are uniformly distributed (b = 1). In the second case, the customer type distribution is positively
skewed (b > 1), and the values of K and w are normalized to zero. A detailed example in which
customer types are exponentially distributed is presented in the paper’s extended appendix.
5.1 Transaction costs and adoption levels
The changes induced in adoption as transaction costs vary are illustrated in Figure 2, for the case
of uniformly distributed θ. An increase in the fixed transaction cost K results in a strict increase in
θK and a strict decrease in θ∗F , thereby increasing the fraction of customers who adopt the fixed-fee,
8The general form of the beta density function is
B(θ; a, b) =
θa−1(1− θ)b−1
β(a, b)
,
where β(a, b) =
1R
0
xa−1(1− x)b−1dx is the beta function with parameters a and b.
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Figure 3: Changes in profits and surplus as transaction costs varies
reducing the set of customers who adopt the usage-based contract, and also reducing total adoption.
A directionally identical change occurs with an increase in c. Therefore, a reduction in either the
fixed transaction costs of administering usage-based pricing (from an increase in the adoption of
online billing, for instance) or of the variable transaction costs of administering usage-based pricing
(from increased ease of using online customer support, for instance) should induce sellers to alter
their pricing structures in a manner that shifts users away from fixed-fee pricing.
5.2 Profits, surplus and welfare
Based on the expressions derived in Table 2, deriving expressions for profits, customer surplus and
total surplus is straightforward. These expressions are algebraically cumbersome and are omitted
for brevity, but are illustrated in Figure 3 for K = 0. Profits are strictly decreasing in both c
and K upto a point, after which they are constant, since no more customers adopt usage-based
pricing. Consumer surplus decreases with c and K initially, then increases, and is often higher at
those values of (c,K) for which only usage-based contracts are offered than it is for c = K = 0.
Interestingly, total surplus (the sum of profits and consumer surplus) decreases initially in c, but
then increases as c increases, though it attains its maximum at c = K = 0.
The economic intuition behind these observations is explained in Figure 4, for changes in c,
with K normalized to zero. There are two sets of effects that an increase in c has on total surplus.
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Figure 4: The drivers of changes in total surplus: a closer look
Firstly, there is a negative indirect effect — owing to the reduction in both the number of adopters
of the usage-based contract, and the quantity used by each, total customer utility reduces. In
addition, there is a direct cost effect — the transaction costs borne by the firm per unit of usage
increases, which changes both firm profits and total surplus — however, the decrease in usage by the
adopters of usage-based pricing may offset this cost increase. However, there are also two positive
indirect effects. An increase in c increases the number of adopters of the fixed-fee contract, and
all of these customers enjoy higher utility levels, at their maximum value v(θ). In addition, these
customers no longer impose the transaction costs K + cq∗(θ) on the firm. The negative effects
dominates for lower values of c, after which, the positive indirect effects dominate.
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Figure 5: The impact of an increase in marginal customer value w on customer adoption.
5.3 Changes in customer value and market evolution
The changes in adoption when either w or b vary are more subtle. An increase in w results in a
decrease in both θK and θ∗F , as shown in Figure 5. This indicates an increase in both the total
number of adopters, as well as the fraction of adopters of the fixed fee. For parameter values of
interest9, θK decreases more rapidly than θ∗F with a marginal increase in w, and therefore, the
number of adopters (θ∗F − θK) of the usage-based contract increases as well. Changes in b alter the
shape of the type distribution as well, and their effect on adoption is ascertained by examining the
signs of the total derivatives ddb [1−F (θ
∗
F )] and
d
db [F (θ
∗
F )−F (θK)], which measure the net changes
on the fraction of customers adopting the fixed-fee and usage-based pricing schedules. The former
is positive and the latter is negative, suggesting a shift away from fixed-fee pricing as b decreases10.
Early-stage information or technology markets commonly feature a high concentration of oc-
casional experimenters on the low end of the market, along with a small fraction of active early
innovators who constitute a bulk of total usage. As the market matures, the distribution of cus-
tomers over usage levels evens out. For instance, average monthly usage levels per customer in
the online services market increased steadily over the first few years of the Internet boom — as of
late 2001, average AOL usage had more than doubled to about 40 hours per month — and Jupiter
9More precisely, for any c and K such that there are at least some adopters of the usage-based contract, it can be
shown that
dθ∗F
dw
> − 1
2
, while dθK
dw
< − 1
2
, and therefore dθK
dw
<
dθ∗F
dw
< 0.
10Similar results are obtained for the exponential distribution, which is also positively skewed, and this analysis is
available in the extended appendix of the paper.
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Media-Metrix survey data from May 2001 on overall US residential online usage indicates that the
distribution of customers over usage levels has flattened out, especially below the mean. This is
the kind of distributional change corresponding to a gradual decrease in b. The analysis above
indicates that it is optimal for the provider to penetrate such a market initially with a pricing
scheme that induces the adoption of a relatively low fixed-fee. Over time, they should gradually
increase this fixed fee, while inducing an increase in the adoption of usage-based pricing. Moreover,
if the product becomes more valuable on average (from the addition of new features over time, for
instance, which corresponds to an increase in w), this is also optimally responded to by increasing
the fraction of customers who adopt usage-based pricing.
5.4 Minimum fees and quantity discounting
Inspection of the usage-based contract in Table 2 indicates that the explicit usage-based pricing
function of the seller takes the form:
p(q) =
µ
1 + bc+w
1 + b
¶
q − q
2
2(1 + b)
for q ≥ q∗(θK). (22)
As discussed in Section 4.1, when K > 0, then q∗(θK) > 0, and consequently, this is a nonlinear
two-part tariff, which a minimum fee of τ∗(θK) for a usage level between 0 and a pre-specified
upper limit q∗(θK), and additional variable payments for usage above q∗(θK). Moreover, the
function p(q) is strictly concave, indicating an increasing level of volume discounts with usage. A
useful measure of the percentage of discounting is the expression
³
−p11(q)p1(q)
´
, which measures the
rate of decrease p11(q) of the variable price (or analogously, the concavity of the pricing function),
normalized for variable price p1(q). From (22),
−p11(q)
p1(q)
=
1
1 + bc+w− q . (23)
Therefore, as w increases, the percentage discount offered should progressively decrease. Intuitively,
the increase in marginal value increases the level of usage chosen by each customer; moreover, it
is optimal for the firm to induce a higher fraction of the market to adopt its fixed-fee contract, as
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illustrated in Figure 4. The relative benefits of the quantity discount for the firm are consequently
lower, which leads to a decrease in the discount. Similarly, an increase in c results in a decrease
in the percentage discount. While the direction of the result is similar, the intuition is slightly
different — in this case, the firm does so because it optimally wants to induce lower usage for all
adopters of the usage-based contract, as well as shifting a fraction of them to the fixed fee.
6 Summary and conclusions
This paper has established that in the presence of any positive transaction costs, sellers of informa-
tion goods should offer their customers a combination of usage-based pricing and unlimited-usage
fixed-fee pricing. These conclusions contrast with well-known results from nonlinear pricing theory
under assumptions similar to those made in this paper (see, for instance, Maskin and Riley, 1984,
or Wilson, 1993), which suggest that optimal monopoly pricing structure is purely usage-based and
fully revealing. These models do not generally explicitly consider transaction costs. We show that
the optimality of pure second-degree price discrimination is highly sensitive to the absence of these
transaction costs — Proposition 2 has established that when there are no variable production costs,
a purely usage-based pricing scheme is never optimal for any C(q) > 0. This is an important new
conclusion for any seller developing pricing policy for their information goods.
Proposition 4 proves that the optimal usage-based contract is independent of the fixed-fee,
which reduces a complex constrained problem to a relatively simpler and more tractable one. The
assumptions needed on customer preferences and heterogeneity for this result to work are fairly
mild. Applying Proposition 4 is relatively straightforward, as illustrated in Section 5 and appendix
B.2. It is hoped that this result will enable further development of focused and rigorous models for
specific information pricing problems.
These results generalize existing pricing guidelines for information goods. For instance, Varian
(2000) proved that with two customer types and linear utility, a ‘buy only’ pricing regime (which
corresponds to offering only an unlimited usage fixed-fee in our model) is strictly preferable to one
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that includes renting (usage-based pricing in our model) so long as the transaction costs of renting
are positive (non-zero transaction costs C(q) in our model). This result is intuitively appealing,
and highlights the importance of considering transaction costs when pricing information goods. By
generalizing this intuition, this paper has established that while fixed fees are always profitable,
the two kinds of pricing schemes can optimally co-exist.
Moreover, all of the paper’s results about the optimal design of pricing schedules continue to hold
even if these transaction costs are borne by the customer, rather than by the seller. For instance,
when consuming under a usage-based pricing schedule, the customer may bear costs of monitoring
and controlling their cumulative monthly usage. Even under this scenario, it is always optimal for
the seller to offer both fixed-fee as well as usage-based pricing, and if the costs borne by customers
are high enough, only the fixed fee. This is one explanation for why Sprint recently switched from
per-Mb usage-based pricing to fixed-fee pricing for their wireless web service. Optimal usage levels
q∗(θ) for this problem are analytically identical to those derived in this paper, and the expressions
for optimal total prices can be obtained by simply adjusting the corresponding τ∗(θ) expressions
downward by the transaction costs borne by the customer at each usage level q∗(θ).
In the absence of transaction costs, Lemma 4 of the paper confirms that pure usage-based
second-degree price discrimination is still optimal, even for zero-variable cost information goods.
An example of a digital product category that uses this pricing strategy is back-end corporate
software (such as database engines and application servers). Pricing is tied to server processor
speed, and transaction costs are eliminated by coding the maximum allowable processor speed into
the software delivered.
Some other key managerial insights from the paper are summarized below.
— As advances in electronic business transactions drive down the costs associated with admin-
istering usage-based contracts, sellers of information goods should adjust their pricing policy so as
to increase the scope and adoption of their usage-based pricing schedules.
— If the administering of usage-based pricing involves a fixed per-customer transaction cost
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which is triggered by any positive usage level, the optimal usage-based pricing schedule should
include a minimum fee for usage upto a pre-specified level, and variable pricing beyond this.
— Typically, the variable pricing described above will feature volume discounts. Moreover, the
extent of discounting should decrease as marginal value increases, but should increase as variable
transaction costs reduce, or as the customer distribution becomes less skewed.
— In early-stage information markets characterized by a high-concentration of low-usage cus-
tomers and a small fraction of active early adopters, low fixed-fee penetration pricing is a good
strategy. This is especially true if there are setup or periodic infrastructure costs associated with
administering usage-based pricing. As the market matures and the distribution of customers across
different usage levels evens out, sellers should increase their fixed fees, and gradually expand their
usage-based pricing options.
Propositions 2 and 4 also complement the basic rationale for bundling information goods, as
prescribed by Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) — that a larger bundle of information goods increases
the average customer valuation per unit good. Therefore, if the bundle is treated as the potential
set of goods the consumer might use, marginal value from usage for each customer will increase
with the size of the bundle. When the seller chooses the right combination of fixed-fee and usage
based contracts, this increase in per-unit value will lead to an increase the fraction of customers
who choose a usage-based contract. The seller will also be able to extract more surplus from
customers than it would have either under pure bundling, or with a smaller bundle.
If one were to interpret q in our model as quality instead of quantity, it is identical to one of
vertical differentiation, with a continuum of possible product versions, a continuum of customer
types, and costs of versioning according to C(q). In the context of information goods with multiple
features, where quality is proportionate to the number of features, Proposition 2 indicates that if
versioning is costly, it is always optimal to offer a high-priced version with all possible features, that
allows customers to self-customize (that is, choose the features that they want). This is consistent
with Jones and Mendelson (1998) and Bhargava and Choudhury (2001). However, Proposition 4
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indicates that it is often optimal to offer limited-feature versions as well, and that these will be
adopted by a subset of customers so long as the cost of versioning is not too high.
The cost structure of information goods often leads to natural monopoly. However, competition
is also a significant issue in pricing, and a focus of my ongoing work is competitive nonlinear
pricing for information goods. Undifferentiated nonlinear price competition is not sustainable for
information goods, since the equilibrium outcome is either marginal cost pricing, or minimum
average cost pricing (Mandy, 1992). The latter outcome suggests infinite-usage fixed-fee pricing,
since the average cost per unit for information goods is always strictly decreasing in usage. A
promising alternative is presented by Fishburn, Odlyzko and Siders (1997), who model a repeated
game in which one player chooses only a fixed-fee, and the other chooses only a linear usage-based
price. Approaches which may yield more general results involve modeling horizontally differentiated
information goods (as in the monopoly model of Weber, 2001), using a model of monopolistic
competition (as in Banker, Khosla, and Sinha 1998), or modeling the presence of an outside good
(as in Jullien, 2000). I hope to add to this literature in the near future.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose that q1(θ) < 0 for some θ. This implies that q(θˆ) > q(θˆ+ ε) for
some θˆ ∈ [θ, θ] and some ε > 0. Applying the condition [IC] at θˆ and (θˆ + ε) respectively yields:
[IC] at θˆ : U(q(θˆ), θˆ)− τ(θˆ) ≥ U(q(θˆ + ε), θˆ)− τ(θˆ + ε). (24)
[IC] at (θˆ + ε) : U(q(θˆ + ε), θˆ + ε)− τ(θˆ + ε) ≥ U(q(θˆ), θˆ + ε)− τ(θˆ). (25)
Combining (24) and (25) and eliminating [τ (θˆ)− τ(θˆ + ε)] yields:
U(q(θˆ), θˆ + ε)− U(q(θˆ + ε), θˆ + ε) ≥ U(q(θˆ), θˆ)− U(q(θˆ + ε), θˆ). (26)
Since q(θˆ) > q(θˆ+ ε), and θˆ+ ε > θˆ, equation (26) implies that U2(q, θ) ≤ 0 for some θ ∈ [θˆ, θˆ+ ε],
a contradiction. This proves that q1(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ. Now, applying first-order conditions for [IC]
to hold for customer type θ yields:
U1(q(θ), θ)q1(θ)− τ1(θ) = 0 for all θ, (27)
which ensures that q1(θ) ≥ 0⇒ τ1(θ) ≥ 0, and proves part (a). Furthermore,
d
dθ
[U(q(θ), θ)− τ(θ)] = U1(q(θ), θ)q1(θ) + U2(q(θ), θ)− τ1(θ). (28)
Combining (27) and (28) and using U2(q, θ) > 0 establishes part (b), and complete the proof. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2: Recall that ψ(θ) = v(θ) − U(q(θ), θ) + τ(θ). Differentiating both sides
with respect to θ and using (27) yields:
ψ1(θ) = v1(θ)− U2(q(θ), θ). (29)
Since v(θ) = lim
q→∞
U(q, θ), it follows that v1(θ) = lim
q→∞
U2(q, θ). Since U12(q, θ) > 0, and U(q, θ)
is monotonic in q, this implies that v1(θ) > U2(q, θ) for all q < ∞, which in turn implies that
ψ1(θ) > 0 so long as q(θ) <∞, and completes the proof. ¥
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Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose that τ∗(θ)−C(q∗(θ)) is strictly decreasing at some θL ∈ [θ, θ].
We can therefore define a type θH > θL as:
θH = min{θ : θ > θL and τ∗(θ)−C(q∗(θ)) = τ∗(θL)−C(q∗(θL)), (30)
with θH = θ if a type θH ∈ [θ, θ] according to (30) does not exist. The continuity of τ∗(θ), q∗(θ)
and C(q) ensures that
τ∗(θ)−C(q∗(θ)) < τ∗(θL)−C(q∗(θL)) (31)
for all θ ∈ (θL, θH). Now, define the contract q(θ), τ(θ) as follows:
q(θ) = q∗(θ), τ(θ) = τ∗(θ), for θ /∈ [θL, θH ]; (32)
q(θ) = q∗(β(θ)), τ(θ) = τ∗(β(θ)), for θ ∈ [θL, θH ], (33)
where
β(θ) = θL if U(q
∗(θL), θ)− τ∗(θL) ≥ U(q∗(θH), θ)− τ∗(θH); (34)
β(θ) = θH if U(q
∗(θL), θ)− τ∗(θL) < U(q∗(θH), θ)− τ∗(θH). (35)
Since q∗(θ), τ∗(θ) is incentive-compatible, and U2(q, θ) > 0, it is easily shown that q(θ), τ(θ) is also
incentive-compatible. Moreover, since f(θ) > θ for all θ, (31) implies that the seller’s profits by
offering q(θ), τ(θ) are strictly higher than those from q∗(θ), τ ∗(θ), which contradicts the fact that
q∗(θ), τ∗(θ) is optimal, and proves part (a).
An identical argument for each sub-interval [θL, θH ] whose interior in which τ∗(θ)−C(q∗(θ)) is
strictly negative establishes part (b). The result follows. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3: This proposition uses the following lemma, a slight generalization
of a well-known result (Maskin and Riley, 1984), which proved in the extended appendix:
Lemma 4 If the fixed component of transaction costs is zero, and therefore C(q) = c(q), then
the unique optimal usage-based contract q(θ), τ(θ) for any interval [θL, θH ] satisfies the following
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conditions for all θ ∈ [θL, θH ]:
U1(q(θ), θ) = c1(q(θ)) + U12(q(θ), θ)
F (θH)− F (θ)
f(θ)
(36)
τ(θ) = U(q(θ), θ)−
θZ
θL
U2(q(x), x)dx (37)
Also, if U122(q, θ) ≤ 0, then q1(θ) > 0 for all θ such that q(θ) > 0.
The problem above is termed the zero-fixed-cost problem for the interval [θL, θH ]. An important
feature of this lemma is that the allocation q(θ) is independent of the lower support θL. Therefore,
for each θ ∈ [θL, θH ], the value of q(θ) that is optimal for [θL, θH ] is the same as the value of q(θ)
that would be optimal for the interval [θ, θH ]. Total payment τ(θ) increases with θL, of course.
Now, let q∗(θ), τ∗(θ) be the optimal usage-based contract for the entire interval, and for a given
K > 0. Term this the solution to the positive-fixed-cost problem. Define Θ ⊂ [θ, θ] as the set of
types who use non-zero quantities under this contract:
Θ = {θ : q∗(θ) > 0}. (38)
Clearly, τ∗(θ) = 0 for θ /∈ Θ. From Lemma 1 (a), we know that q∗1(θ) ≥ 0, which implies that Θ is
a continuous interval [θK , θ], where θK ≥ θ (this is ignoring the trivial case where Θ is empty and
the firm makes no profits). Also, from Lemma 3(b), we know that for each θ ∈ [θK , θ],
τ∗(θ) ≥ K + c(q∗(θ)). (39)
Next, we establish that q∗(θ), τ∗(θ) is also the optimal contract for the zero-fixed-cost problem for
the interval [θK , θ]. If we assume the converse, the uniqueness result of Lemma 4 therefore implies
the existence of an incentive-compatible contract q(θ), τ(θ) such that
θZ
θL
[τ(θ)− c(q(θ))]f(θ)dθ >
θZ
θL
[τ∗(θ)− c(q∗(θ))]f(θ)dθ, (40)
which implies that
θZ
θK
[τ(θ)− c(q(θ))−K]f(θ)dθ >
θZ
θK
[τ∗(θ)− c(q∗(θ))−K]f(θ)dθ. (41)
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Since τ∗(θ) = q∗(θ) = 0 for θ < θK , (41) implies that q(θ), τ(θ) is a more profitable solution to the
positive-fixed-cost problem than q∗(θ), τ∗(θ), a contradiction. Therefore, q∗(θ) always satisfies
U1(q
∗(θ), θ) = c1(q
∗(θ)) + U12(q
∗(θ), θ)
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
, (42)
which specifies a unique q∗(θ) for each θ that is also independent of the value of θK . The result
follows by choosing θK as the lowest value of θ that satisfies (39). ¥
Proof of Proposition 4: Given an interval [θK , θ] and a type θF ∈ (θK , θ), suppose that with
fixed costs of zero, the firm wants to design the optimal usage-based contract qˆ(θ), τˆ (θ) and the
optimal fixed fee Tˆ , subject to the constraint that all customer types θ ≥ θF adopt the fixed fee,
and all customer types in the sub-interval [θK , θF ] adopt the usage-based contract. We term this a
constrained zero-fixed cost problem for the interval [θK , θ] with a constraint on θF . Proposition 2
has shown that constraining customers of type θF to be indifferent between any fixed-fee contract
T and the usage-based contract will ensure that all types θ ∈ [θK , θF ) will choose the usage-based
contract, and all types θ ≥ θF will choose the fixed fee. Therefore, from the proof of Lemma 4, we
know that this problem of finding qˆ(θ), τˆ(θ) and Tˆ can be formulated as:
max
q(.),T


θFZ
θK
[U(q(θ), θ)− c(q(θ))− U2(q(θ), θ)F (θF )−F (θ)f(θ) ]f(θ)dθ

+ T (1− F (θF )), (43)
subject to the constraint:


θFZ
θK
U2(q(θ), θ)dθ

− [v(θF )− T ] = 0. (44)
Denote the Lagrangian for this problem as
L(q(.), T,λ) =
θFZ
θK
³
U(q(θ), θ)− c(q(θ))− U2(q(θ), θ)F (θF )−F (θ)f(θ)
´
f(θ)dθ
+T [1− F (θF )] + λ




θFZ
θK
U2(q(θ), θ)dθ

− v(θF ) + T

 . (45)
The first-order necessary conditions for any local maximizer to this constrained problem are:·
∂L
∂q
= 0
¸
:
³
U1(q(θ), θ)− c1(q(θ))− U12(q(θ), θ)[F (θF )−F (θ)−λf(θ) ]
´
f(θ) = 0 ∀θ ∈ [θK , θF ], (46)
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·
∂L
∂T
= 0
¸
: [1− F (θF )] + λ = 0, (47)
and ·
∂L
∂λ
= 0
¸
:
θFZ
θK
U2(q(θ), θ)dθ = v(θF )− T. (48)
Rearranging (47) yields the value of the Lagrangian multiplier
λ = −[1− F (θF )]. (49)
Substituting (49) into (46) yields:
µ
U1(q(θ), θ)− c− U12(q(θ), θ)[
F (θF )− F (θ)− (−[1− F (θF )])
f(θ)
]
¶
f(θ) = 0, (50)
which simplifies to
U1(q(θ), θ) = c1(q(θ)) + U12(q(θ), θ)[
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
] ∀θ ∈ [θK , θF ]. (51)
Equation (51) implies that for any constrained zero-fixed cost problem, the usage-based quantity
q(θ) optimally chosen by each type θ in [θK , θF ] is independent of θK , independent of θF , and is
also independent of the value of the fixed fee T .
Now, suppose q∗(θ), τ∗(θ) and T ∗ are a solution to the seller’s original problem of choosing the
optimal combination of usage-based pricing and fixed-fee, for a specific K > 0, and for the entire
interval [θ, θ]. Let [θK , θ] be the set of types for which q∗(θ) > 0. If all types [θK , θ] adopt T ∗, the
main result is trivially true. If not, Proposition 2 ensures that there is a customer type θ∗F ∈ (θK , θ)
who is indifferent between adopting q∗(θ), τ∗(θ) and adopting T ∗, and Proposition 1 ensures that
all types in [θ∗F , θ] adopt T
∗.
It now follows that the contracts q∗(θ), τ∗(θ) and T ∗ must also be a solution to the problem
of choosing the optimal combination of usage-based pricing and fixed-fee, for a constrained zero-
cost-problem for the interval [θK , θ], and with constraint on the type θ∗F . Suppose it is not such a
solution. This implies the existence of q(θ), τ(θ) and T such that types [θK , θ∗F ) adopt q(θ), τ(θ),
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types [θ∗F , θ] adopt T , and
θ∗FZ
θK
[τ(θ)− c(q(θ))]f(θ)dθ + T [1− F (θ∗F )] >
θ∗FZ
θL
[τ∗(θ)− c(q∗(θ))]f(θ)dθ + T ∗[1− F (θ∗F )], (52)
Subtracting K[F (θ∗F )− F (θK)] from both sides of (52) implies that q(θ), τ(θ) and T satisfy
θ∗FZ
θK
[τ(θ)−c(q(θ))−K]f(θ)dθ+T [1−F (θ∗F )] >
θ∗FZ
θL
[τ∗(θ)−c(q∗(θ))−K]f(θ)dθ+T ∗[1−F (θ∗F )], (53)
which contradicts the fact that q∗(θ), τ∗(θ) and T ∗are a solution to the seller’s original problem.
Since (51) is necessary for any solution to the constrained zero-cost-problem, it follows that
U1(q
∗(θ), θ) = c1(q∗(θ)) + U12(q∗(θ), θ)[
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
] ∀θ ∈ [θK , θ]. (54)
Note that the expressions in (54) are independent of θK and are also independent of T ∗. This proves
part (a). The value of the fixed-fee at which type θF is indifferent is v(θF )−U(q∗(θF ), θF )+τ∗(θF ).
Part (b) follows from the fact that firm will choose the profit maximizing value of θ∗F , and that the
corresponding optimal usage-based contract (q∗(θ), τ∗(θ)) is independent of the choice of θ∗F . Part
(c) simply computes the fixed-fee T ∗ at this optimal value of θ∗F . This completes the proof.
Appendix B: Extended appendix
This appendix describes how setup costs of administering usage-based pricing may affect pricing
policy, then presents an extended example which applies Propositions 2, 3 and 4, and concludes
with the proof of Lemma 4.
B.1 The effect of setup costs of administering usage-based pricing on pricing policy
The purpose of this section is to discuss how the presence of a setup cost for offering usage-
based pricing may cause a seller to offer pure fixed-fee pricing. However, in the event that the seller
offers both fixed-fee and usage-based pricing, this type of cost does not change the optimal pricing
schedule.
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Suppose that independent of the per-customer transaction costs C(q) = K + c(q) of admin-
istering usage-based pricing, there is a setup cost S that is borne if the seller offers usage-based
pricing to any subset of customers. S models those costs which must be incurred in order to
make administering usage-based pricing feasible, but are independent of the eventual number of
adopters. For instance, offering usage-based pricing may necessitate bearing the cost of setting
up a process for administering non-electronic invoices and collecting non-electronic payments. S
could also represent periodic infrastructure or labor costs that are independent of the number of
customers charged using usage-based pricing, and are incurred simply by its existence. Of course,
there may be other per-customer fixed and variable transaction costs as well, which are modeled
by C(q).
Suppose the firm were to offer pure fixed-fee pricing. In this case, the optimal fixed-fee TP
would solve TP = v(θP ), where
θP = argmax
θ
v(θ)[1− F (θ)]. (55)
The first-order conditions of (55) imply that θP satisfies
v(θP )
v1(θP )
=
1− F (θP )
f(θP )
, (56)
and the firm’s profits from pure fixed-fee pricing are
ΠP = v(θP )[1− F (θP )]. (57)
In contrast, let the optimal contracts prescribed by Proposition 4 be (q∗(θ), τ∗(θ)) and T ∗, and
let the lowest type indifferent between fixed-fee and usage-based pricing be θ∗F . This implies that:
T ∗ = v(θ∗F )− U(q∗(θ∗F ), θ∗F ) + τ∗(θ∗F ), (58)
and the firm’s profits from this combination, before accounting for S are
Π∗ =


θ∗FZ
θK
[τ∗(θ)− c(q∗(θ))−K]f(θ)dθ

+ [v(θ∗F )− U(q∗(θ∗F ), θ∗F ) + τ∗(θ∗F )][1− F (θ∗F )]. (59)
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It is clear that S plays no role in the design of the actual pricing schedule above. SinceΠ∗ maximizes
the firm’s profits in the absence of S, it is clear that either Π∗−S or ΠP maximize the firm’s profits
in its presence (if there were a different combination of fixed-fee and usage-based pricing that were
more profitable in the presence of S, this would clearly also be more profitable in the absence of
S). Therefore, the setup cost S causes the firm to offer pure fixed-fee pricing v(θP ) if:
S ≥ Π∗ −ΠP , (60)
and does not alter pricing policy otherwise. This simple analysis suggests that firms with a smaller
revenue base are more likely to choose pure fixed-fee pricing, and complements the observation that
pure fixed-fee penetration pricing may be optimal in early-stage markets.
B.2 Example with exponentially distributed types
This example uses a quadratic utility function of the form:
U(q, θ) = θq − 1
2
q2 for q ≤ θ; (61)
U(q, θ) =
θ2
2
for q > θ, (62)
and assumes that customer types θ are exponentially distributed with mean β, that is, f(θ) = e
−θ/β
β ,
and F (θ) = 1 − e−θ/β. Relative to a flat distribution, the exponential distribution is positively-
skewed — the mean and median are higher than the mode — in fact, f(θ) is strictly decreasing in θ.
This represents a scenario where there are a relatively higher number of customers who have a low
utility from usage, and relatively fewer higher types11. Many markets for information goods are
well characterized by a positively-skewed type distribution, with a number of customers who wish
to use the good only occasionally, and relatively fewer ‘power-users’ whose usage levels are very
high. For simplicity, K is normalized to zero, and transaction costs are assumed linear. That is,
C(q) = cq. This enables one to highlight the effects caused by changes in the type distribution.
11In fact, the exponential distribution is the most positively skewed distribution one can use while preserving the
requirement that the reciprocal of the hazard rate be non-increasing. It has a constant hazard rate 1β — which is also
an analytically attractive property.
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Varying β varies both the mean and the shape of the distribution. An increase in β shifts
customer types towards the right, resulting in fewer lower-type customers and more higher-type
customers. Consequently, the average customer type increases, as does the average customer
demand.
Applying Proposition 4 yields the optimal usage-based contract:
q∗(θ) = θ − (β + c) for θ ≥ θK ; (63)
q∗(θ) = 0 for θ < θK ,
where θK = (β + c), and:
τ∗(θ) = (β + c)(θ − (β + c)) for θ ≥ θK ; (64)
= 0 for θ < θK .
The optimal usage-based contract is therefore linear in usage. The first-order condition for (18) in
Proposition 4 solves to:
θ∗F =
(β + c)2
2c
, (65)
and the optimal fixed-fee contract simplifies to:
T ∗ =
β(β + c)2
2c
. (66)
By inspection, ∂θK∂c > 0 and
∂θ∗F
∂c < 0 for all 0 < c < β. Consequently, increases in c shrink the
fraction of customers who adopt the usage-based contract. This segment shrinks to zero when
c = β, which is the point at which θ∗F = θK ; for c > β, only a fixed-fee contract is offered.
Furthermore,
∂θ∗F
∂β
=
β + c
c
; (67)
∂θK
∂β
= 1, (68)
and therefore
∂θ∗F
∂β >
∂θK
∂β > 0 for all β > 0, which implies that an increase in β increases the
number of types adopting the usage-based contract, and increases the number of non-adopting
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Figure 6: Changes in customer adoption as β increases and the distribution flattens out.
types12. However, the shape of the distribution also changes with β, and therefore changes in
interval widths do not directly correspond to changes in customer density. If β > c, the fraction
of customers adopting the fixed-fee contract is 1− F (θ∗F ), and the fraction of customers adopting
the usage-based contract is F (θ∗F − F (θK). Since
∂
∂β
[1− F (θ∗F )] =
(c2 − β2)e−
(β+c)2
2βc
2β2c
(69)
is strictly negative for β > c, an increase in β results in a decrease in the number of customers
adopting the fixed fee contract. Note that these are comparative statics results — the shift away
from the fixed-fee contract is after taking into account the adjustments that the firm will make
to its pricing schedule as a consequence of this increase in β — clearly, both the fixed fee and the
12β is a measure of the average unit value θ that customers place on the information good, which places its
comparison with c in context.
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usage-based fees will also increase as β increases. Also, since
∂
∂β
[F (θ∗F )− F (θK)] =
(β2 − c2)e−(1− b2c+ cb ) + 2c2e−
β+c
β
2β2c
(70)
is strictly positive for β ≥ c, an increase in β causes an increase in the number of customers
adopting the usage-based contract. When β ≤ c, (69) indicates that as β increases towards c, the
fraction of customers adopting the fixed-fee contract (which is the only contract offered in this
case) increases. Figure 6 illustrates the customer intervals which adopt the fixed-fee contract, the
usage-based contract and neither, as β varies.
The firm’s profits from offering just the optimal usage-based contract, from offering just a
fixed-fee contract, and from offering the optimal combination of contracts, are compared below:
ΠU (β, c) =
∞Z
θK
[τ∗(θ)− cq∗(θ)]f(θ)dθ = β2e−
β+c
β ; (71)
ΠF (β) = max
p
[p(1− F (
p
2p)] =
2β2
e2
; (72)
Π(β, c) =
θ∗FZ
θK
[τ∗(θ)− cq∗(θ)]f(θ)dθ + T ∗[1− θ∗F ] = β2e
−β+cβ + βce−
(β+c)2
2βc .
As expected, ΠU (β, 0) = Π(β, 0), and ΠF (β) = Π(β,β), which confirm that only the optimal
usage-based contract should be offered for c = 0, and that only a fixed-fee contract should be
offered for c ≥ β. It can also be confirmed that T ∗(β,β) = 2β, the optimal fixed-fee contract in
the absence of any usage-based contract.
Under the optimal combination of fixed-fee and usage-based contracts, consumer surplus C(β, c)
and total surplus S(β, c) solve to:
C(β, c) = β2e−
β+c
β + β(β + c)e−
(β+c)2
2βc ; (73)
S(β, c) = 2β2e−
β+c
β + β(β + 2c)e−
(β+c)2
2βc . (74)
Profits, consumer surplus and total surplus are illustrated in Figure 7. Note that as described
in Section 5, after decreasing for a while, both consumer surplus and total surplus increase with c,
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Figure 7: Changes in profits and surplus as transaction costs vary.
consumer surplus is maximized at c = β, and total surplus is maximized at c = 0. For a discussion
of the drivers of these changes, the reader is referred to Section 5.2 and Figure 4 of the main paper.
B.3 Lemma 4 and its proof
Lemma 4 If the fixed component of transaction costs is zero, and therefore C(q) = c(q), then
the unique optimal usage-based contract q(θ), τ(θ) for any interval [θL, θH ] satisfies the following
conditions for all θ ∈ [θL, θH ]:
U1(q(θ), θ) = c1(q(θ)) + U12(q(θ), θ)
F (θH)− F (θ)
f(θ)
(75)
τ(θ) = U(q(θ), θ)−
θZ
θL
U2(q(x), x)dx (76)
Also, if U122(q, θ) ≤ 0, then q1(θ) > 0 for all θ such that q(θ) > 0.
Proof. The proof has four parts:
(a) Reduction of [IC] to a simpler form: [IC] is satisfied if θ is the solution to:
max
x∈[θL,θH ]
U(q(x), θ)− τ(x), (77)
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for all θ in [θL, θH ]. The necessary and sufficient conditions for (77) are:
U1(q(θ), θ)q1(θ)− τ1(θ) = 0; (78)
U11(q(θ), θ)(q1(θ))2 +U1(q(θ), θ)q11(θ)− τ11(θ) ≤ 0. (79)
(78) is the first-order necessary condition, and (79) is the second-order sufficient condition. Differ-
entiating (78) with respect to θ yields:
τ11(θ) = U11(q(θ), θ)(q1(θ))2 + U12(q(θ), θ)q1(θ) + U1(q(θ), θ)q11(θ), (80)
which when substituted into (79) yields:
U12(q(θ), θ)q1(θ) ≥ 0. (81)
The Spence-Mirrlees conditions ensure that U12(q(θ), θ) > 0, which implies that [IC] has reduced
to:
τ1(θ) = U1(q(θ), θ)q1(θ); (82)
q1(θ) ≥ 0. (83)
(b) Redefining the firm’s objective function: Denote the informational rent of customer
type θ as
s(θ) = U(q(θ), θ)− τ(θ). (84)
Differentiating with respect to θ, and substituting (82) yields:
s1(θ) = U2(q(θ), θ). (85)
(85) and Property 2 of U(q, θ) imply that surplus is strictly increasing in type. Consequently, if [IR]
is satisfied for the lowest type θL, it is satisfied for all others. Since the firm is profit maximizing,
it will choose s(θL) = 0, which implies that:
s(θ) =
θZ
x=θL
U2(q(x), x)dx. (86)
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Since U2(q(x), x) > 0, s(θ) is strictly increasing if q(θ) > 0. Now, (84) and (86) imply that
τ(θ) = U(q(θ), θ)−
θZ
x=θL
U2(q(x), x)dx. (87)
Therefore, the firm’s objective function, which is:
max
q(.),τ(.)
θHZ
θ=θL
[τ(θ)− c(q(θ))]f(θ)dθ (88)
can be rewritten as:
max
q(.)
θHZ
θ=θL
[U(q(θ), θ)− c(q(θ))]f(θ)dθ −
θHZ
θ=θL


θZ
x=θL
U2(q(x), x)dx

 f(θ)dθ. (89)
Integrating the second part of (89) by parts (define G(θ) =
θR
x=θL
U2(q(x), x)dx, note that G(θL) = 0,
and use
θHR
θ=θL
G(θ)f(θ)dθ = [F (θH)G(θH)−
θHR
θ=θL
F (θ)dG(θ)]) — yields:
max
q(.)
θHZ
θ=θL
[U(q(θ), θ)− c(q(θ))]f(θ)dθ −
θHZ
θ=θL
U2(q(θ), θ)[F (θH)− F (θ)]dθ, (90)
which can be rewritten as:
max
q(.)
θHZ
θ=θL
[U(q(θ), θ)− c(q(θ))− U2(q(θ), θ)H(θ, θH)]f(θ)dθ, (91)
where H(θ, θH) =
F (θH)−F (θ)
f(θ) .
(c) Unique solution to unconstrained problem: From (83) and (91), the firm’s problem
is now:
max
q(.)
θHZ
θ=θL
[U(q(θ), θ)− c(q(θ))− U2(q(θ), θ)H(θ, θH)]f(θ)dθ (92)
subject to: q1(θ) ≥ 0. (93)
If the unconstrained version of this problem has a unique solution for which q1(θ) ≥ 0, then this is
the solution to the constrained problem as well.
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The unconstrained problem can be solved by optimizing (92) pointwise to construct q∗(θ). The
first-order conditions for this problem are:
U1(q(θ), θ)− c1(q(θ))− U12(q(θ), θ)H(θ, θH) = 0 ∀θ, (94)
which reduce to:
U1(q(θ), θ) = c1(q(θ)) + U12(q(θ), θ)
F (θH)− F (θ)
f(θ)
∀θ. (95)
The conditions (95) are sufficient if the function:
π(q, θ, θH) = U(q, θ)− c(q)− U2(q, θ)H(θ, θH) (96)
is strictly quasiconcave in q. Differentiating (96) with respect to q yields:
π1(q, θ, θH) = U1(q, θ)− c1(q)− U12(q, θ)H(θ, θH). (97)
Consequently, if π1(q, θ, θH) = 0, (97) implies that:
H(θ, θH) =
U1(q, θ)− c1(q)
U12(q, θ)
. (98)
Also, Property 4 of U(q, θ) assumes that:
∂
∂θ
µ
−U11(q, θ)
U1(q, θ)
¶
≤ 0, (99)
which can be expanded to:
−U112(q, θ)
U1(q, θ)
− −U11(q, θ)U12(q, θ)
(U1(q, θ))2
≤ 0, (100)
or
U112(q, θ) ≥
U11(q, θ)U12(q, θ)
U1(q, θ)
. (101)
Now, differentiating (97) with respect to q yields:
π11(q, θ, θH) = U11(q, θ)− c11(q)− U112(q, θ)H(θ, θH). (102)
Therefore, if π1(q, θ, θH) = 0, (98) and (102) imply that
π11(q, θ, θH) = U11(q, θ)− c11(q)− U112(q, θ)
U1(q, θ)− c1(q)
U12(q, θ)
, (103)
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which when combined with (101) yields
π11(q, θ, θH) ≤ U11(q, θ)− c11(q)−
U11(q, θ)U12(q, θ)
U1(q, θ)
U1(q, θ)− c1(q)
U12(q, θ)
, (104)
which simplifies to:
π11(q, θ, θH) ≤
U11(q, θ)c1(q)
U1(q, θ)
− c11(q). (105)
Since we have restricted c(q) to being ‘not too concave’ in (11) in the following way:
c11(q)
c1(q)
>
U11(q, θ)
U1(q, θ)
, (106)
the RHS of (105) is strictly negative. Consequently, if π1(q, θ, θH) = 0, then π11(q, θ, θH) < 0,
which establishes that π(q, θ, θH) is strictly quasiconcave in q, which in turn ensures that for the
unconstrained problem of (92), first-order conditions (95) yield the unique solution.
(d) Monotonicity of q(θ) in θ: Assume that U122(q(θ), θ) ≤ 0. Differentiating both sides of
(95) yields:
U11(q(θ), θ)q1(θ) + U12(q(θ), θ) = (107)
c11(q(θ))q1(θ) + U112(q(θ), θ)q1(θ)H(θ, θH)
+U122(q(θ), θ)H(θ, θH) + U12(q(θ), θ)H1(θ, θH),
which implies that:
q1(θ) =
U12(q(θ), θ)[1−H1(θ, θH)]−U122(q(θ), θ)H(θ, θH)
U112(q(θ), θ)H(θ, θH) + c11(q(θ))− U11(q(θ), θ)
. (108)
From (102) and the fact that π(q, θ, θH) has been shown to be strictly quasiconcave, we know
that the denominator of (108) is strictly positive. Also, we know that H1(θ, θH) ≤ 0, since the
reciprocal of the hazard rate has been assumed to be non-increasing. Since H(θ, θH) > 0 for all θ
in the interior of [θL, θH ], the numerator of (108) is strictly positive (since we have assumed that
U122(q(θ), θ) ≤ 0 for this part) which implies that q1(θ, θH) > 0.
Since we know that for the optimal q∗(.), necessary condition (95) has to hold for all q∗(θ) > 0,
this establishes that q∗(θ) is strictly increasing in θ when it is non-zero. This also means that
if U122(q(θ), θ) ≤ 0, then the first order conditions (92) define the unique optimal contract q∗(θ).
This completes the proof.
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